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ARTICLE

HEDONIC DAMAGES: PROPERLY A
FACTOR WITHIN PAIN AND
SUFFERING UNDER 42 U.S.C.
SECTION 1983
PATRICK

I.

B. MURRAY*

INTRODUCTION

Title 42 U.S.C. Section 1983' creates a federal cause of action2
for encroachments upon a person's federally guaranteed civil rights.
Enacted to enforce the fourteenth amendment's protection of life,
liberty, and property,3 Section 1983 creates a cause of action for the
* Associate, Clausen Miller Gorman Caffrey & Witous, P.C., Chicago, Ill.
B.A., Creighton University, Omaha, Neb.; J.D., DePaul University College of Law,
Chicago, Ill.
THE VIEWS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE NOT NECESSARILY THOSE OF THE
FIRM OR ITS CLIENTS.
The author would like to thank Professor Susan A. Bandes of the DePaul
University College of Law for her help and guidance with this article. Also, the
author would like to acknowledge Mr. Arthur S. Bresnahan of-Bresnahan & Garvey
in Chicago, Illinois; Ms. Linda A. Wawzenski, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Deputy
Chief-Civil Division of the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Northern District of
Illinois; as well as the law firm of Clausen Miller Gorman Caffrey & Witous, P.C.,
for their assistance.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See also Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social
Services, 436 U.S. 685, 685-86 (1978) (section 1983 gives a remedy for violations of
civil rights); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961) (Section 1983 enforces the
provisions of the fourteenth amendment to the U.S. Constitution).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides that no state shall "deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Id. See also Gomez
v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980).
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deprivation of life by anyone acting "under color of law without due
4

process."1

The final decision to be made by the trier of fact in these cases 5
is the extent to which the plaintiff will be compensated for his injuries. 6
A recent development has arisen with respect to claims involving
wrongful death both in the Section 1983 context and in the common
law tort cases throughout the states. Loss of enjoyment of life, or
more succinctly, hedonic damages,' are beginning to be alleged more
often as a separate and distinct element of damages. Traditionally,
and as it currently exists in many jurisdictions, the award for hedonic

4. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
5.It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss at length the elements to be
proved in a Section 1983 claim. For the purposes of this article, liability has already
been established. Our concern is specifically the proper elements of damages.
6. "Although Section 1983 provides a cause of action for deprivations of
constitutional rights, Section 1983 does not include provisions for the survival of a
cause of action" when a decedent's death directly results from a Violation of the
decedent's constitutional rights. Note, Hedonic Damages in Section 1983 Actions: A
Remedy for the UnconstitutionalDeprivation of Life, 44WASH. & LEE L. REV. 321,
323 (1987) [hereinafter Hedonic Damages]. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
42 U.S.C. § 1988 establishes the procedural framework for Section 1983 actions.
Section 1988 provides in pertinent part:
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district courts
by the provisions of this Title, and of Title 'CIVIL RIGHTS,' . . . for the

protection of all persons in the United States in their .civil rights, and for
their vindication, shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with the
laws of the United States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry the same
into effect; but in all cases where they are not adapted to the object, or are
deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish
offenses against law, the common law, as modified and changed by the
constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction
of such civil or criminal cause is held, so far as same is not inconsistent
with the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to
and govern the said courts in the trial and disposition of the cause ....
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).
The author does not intimate a preference or bias in the use of the masculine
pronoun but does so for the sake of time, brevity, simplicity, and clarity whenever
the gender of the actor is otherwise uncertain.
7. The term "hedonic damages" was first used in the Section 1983 case
Sherrod v. Berry, 629 F. Supp. 159 (N.D. Ill. 1985), aff'd, 827 F.2d 195 (7th Cir.
1987), rev'd on other grounds on reh'g and remanded, 856 F.2d 802 (1988). Hedonic
comes from the Greek work meaning pleasure. WEaSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 1048-49 (1971). Hedonic damages cover the range of damages referred
to as loss of life, loss of enjoyment of life, loss of life's pleasures, loss of expectation
of life, and loss of the value of life.
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damages is a factor in the award granted for pain and suffering.8

The present source of discussion in the area of damages in tort
is whether a plaintiff can be properly compensated under this traditional scheme. The question whether hedonic damages should be

separated from pain and suffering is also at the heart of the issue of
proper compensation in Section 1983 cases. 9 The Federal District

10
Court for the Northern District of Illinois, in Sherrod v. Berry,
began what has become a profound movement which separates and
distinguishes hedonic damages from those damages otherwise awarded
for pain and suffering. The damage award in Sherrod was affirmed
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit."

The purpose of this article is to analyze the proposition advanced
in Sherrod. Part II traces the fundamental purposes of Section 1983.
Part III discusses the concept of hedonic damages and examines how
8. See, e.g., Hoskie v. United States, 666 F.2d 1353, 1357 (10th Cir. 1981)
(New Mexico law allows loss of life activities as part of pain and suffering); Huff v.
Tracy, 57 Cal. App. 3d 939, 943, 129 Cal. Rptr. 551, 553 (1976) (loss of enjoyment
of life is repetitious of pain and suffering); Long v. Yellow Cab Co., 137 I11.App.
3d 324, 328-29, 484 N.E.2d 830, 832-33 (1985) (curtailed future activities and future
pain are a part of pain and suffering); Poyzer v. McGraw, 360 N.W.2d 748, 753
(Iowa 1985) (loss of enjoyment of life is factor in pain and suffering); Missouri Pac.
R.R. v. Lane, 720 S.W.2d 830, 834 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (loss of enjoyment of life
may be a factor in determining damages but is not a separate element); Judd v.
Rowley's Cherry Hill Orchards, Inc., 611 P.2d 1216, 1221 (Utah 1980) (diminished
enjoyment of life is included in pain and suffering); see also Comment, Loss of
Enjoyment of Life as a Separate Element of Damages, 12 PAC. L.J. 965, 967 (1981)
[hereinafter Loss of Enjoyment]. For a discussion of the concept of pain and
suffering, see infra notes 72-79 and accompanying text.
9. See Hedonic Damages, supra note 6, at 328-30.
10. 629 F. Supp. 159 (N.D. Ill. 1985), aff'd, 827 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1987),
rev'd on other grounds on reh'g and remanded, 856 F.2d 802 (1988). It is important
to note that, although this case was reversed and remanded, it was done so on other
grounds. The court specifically stated that on remand, the trial court should look to
the vacated opinion for guidance on the other issues. Sherrod, 856 F.2d at 807-08.
Therefore, the case is still persuasive authority that the Seventh Circuit would hold
the same way on the issue of hedonic damages. The facts in Sherrod were as follows:
Ronald Sherrod was shot and killed by a police officer in Joliet, Illinois. Sherrod
died instantly. He was a nineteen year old black male with no prior criminal record.
However, news accounts and the death certificate incorrectly implicated Sherrod as
a robbery suspect. The decedent's family requested that the Joliet police department
clear Sherrod's name from any criminal connection. They also asked the Chief of
Police to institute disciplinary action against the officer that shot and killed the boy.
Both of these requests were refused. For a discussion of the Sherrod case, see Hedonic
Damages, supra note 6, at 333-37.
11. Sherrod v. Berry, 827 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1987), rev'd on other grounds on
reh'g and remanded, 856 F.2d 802 (1988).
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loss of enjoyment of life damages developed in England and the
United States. Part IV analyzes how hedonic damages are applied in
Section 1983 cases and emphasizes the punitive nature and duplicative
effect of hedonic damages. It suggests courts have been unfaithful to
the teachings of Carey v. Piphus,'2 a United States Supreme Court
case that indicated the appropriate avenue for courts to take when
fashioning damages in civil rights cases. Tensions arise in Section 1983
cases by virtue of courts fashioning remedies after a determination
that the state tort law on damages is in conflict with the federal
statute. Through proper operation of Section 1988, courts generally
have this authority. It is questionable whether the wrongful death
statutes that do not allow separate hedonic recovery are, in fact,
contrary to federal law. Part V addresses the applicable principles of
federalism that confront this area of Section 1983 law. This article
submits that hedonic damages are properly a factor in the damages
formula as part of the pain and suffering award in Section 1983
deprivation of life cases. Hedonic damages are not proper, however,
when they are made a separate and distinct element of the compensatory package awarded by the trier of fact.
II.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: PURPOSES UNDERLYING TITLE
SECTION

1983

42 U.S.C.

Title 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 has been, at least since Monroe v.
Pape,'3 one of the most litigated sections of the United States Code.
Originally enacted in 1875 as an enforcement statute to the fourteenth
amendment, an important effect of its passage was to deter future
abuses of power by individuals acting under color of state law., 4 One
of the primary reasons Section 1983 was passed was to provide a
remedy for the victims of racial killing and other acts violative of the
fourteenth amendment.' 5 The Seventh Circuit in Bell v. City of
Milwaukee,' 6 made it quite clear that Section 1983 expresses an
''unequivocal concern for protecting life.''' 7 In reaching its decision,
the court quoted Presidenf Grant's statement to Congress which fueled
the passage of the Ku Klux Klan Act: there exists a "condition of
affairs in some States of the Union rendering life and property
12. 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
13. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).

14. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 268 (1981).
15. Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1239 (7th Cir. 1984) (delineating

the purposes of Section 1983).
16. 746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1984).
17. Id. at 1239.
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insecure .... ,,18 Therefore, it was necessary for Congress to take the
appropriate action and provide an injured person with a remedy.
Section 1983 should not be read, however, as an enactment which
intended to revoke completely the authority of the states. Similar to
the United States Supreme Court conclusion in Stefanelli v. Minard,19
Section 1983 should be interpreted so as to strike a proper balance
between the states and the federal government. 20 Further support for
that basic principle can be seen in Title 42 U.S.C. Section 1988,21 in
which Congress indicated its desire to respect the states' interests in
cases involving deprivations of one's civil rights. 22 The operation of
Section 1988 directs the federal courts to apply the common law of
"the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil ...
cause is held .... ,,23 This is so only to the extent that those laws are
"not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States
,,24

What this means, of course, is that state laws may not interfere
with recovery in Section 1983 actions for injuries caused in a deprivation of life case. 25 For example, a state's common law cannot bar
a plaintiff's Section 1983 action for the deprivation of life when the
decedent's death was a result of unconstitutional action. 26 If such a
result were allowed, the function and purpose of Section 1983 would
be flouted. Section 1983 should be construed so as to fulfill its
purpose. 27 That purpose is to provide compensation to those who
have suffered a deprivation of life, liberty, or property as a result of
actions taken by one under color of law. 2 As Justice Douglas said in
18. Id. (quoting Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 244 (1871)) (emphasis in
original).
19. 342 U.S. 117 (1951).
20. Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 121 (1951) (construing a similar civil
rights law which protected a citizen's constitutional rights against oppressive actions
by anyone acting under color of state law). See also United States v. City of
Philadelphia, 644 F.2d 187, 198 (3d Cir. 1980).
21. For text, see supra note 6. For further discussion of Section 1988's effect
on civil rights damage awards, see infra notes 153-79 and accompanying text.

22. Unfortunately, the development of Section 1988 and its appropriate application is a topic that is well beyond the breadth of this paper.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).
24. Id.
25. O'Connor v. Several Unknown Correctional Officers, 523 F. Supp. 1345,
1347-48 (E.D. Va. 1981).
26. Rosa v. Cantrell, 705 F.2d 1208, 1221-24 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 821 (1983).
27. See Birnbaum v. Trussell, 371 F.2d 672, 676 (2d Cir. 1966).
28. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167
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Monroe v. Pape, this Section governing deprivation of civil rights by

persons "should be read against the background of tort liability that
makes a [person] responsible for the natural consequences of his
actions. "29
It is against this background of tort liability with respect to
damages that the discussion of hedonic damages arises. The next
section discusses the concept of hedonic damages as it was known in
tort before its present innovative application.
III.

HEDONIC DAMAGES

The concept of hedonic damages3 ° is not new to the damages
formula in Anglo-American tort law.3 The term itself, however, was
first used in the case of Sherrod v. Berry.3 2 Many years before Judge
Leighton used the term "hedonic" in his opinion for the Northern
District of Illinois in Sherrod, the English courts had been awarding
separate damages for loss of expectation of life.33 In the case of Rose

v. Ford,3 4 the House of Lords allowed recovery for the plaintiff's loss
of expectation of life35 in addition to that allowed as a separate
damage award for the decedent's estate.3 6 In coming to this decision,
the House of Lords had interpreted Section 1 of the Law Reform
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act of 1934. 31
However promising this may seem as supporting a long tradition
of compensation for hedonic losses, one must look to the subsequent

(1961); Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir. 1984); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1982).
29. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 187.
30. See supra note 7.
31. For a discussion of the history of hedonic damages see Hedonic Damages,
supra note 6.
32. 629 F. Supp. 159, 162-64 (N.D. Ill. 1985). See Blodgett, Hedonic Damages,
71 A.B.A. J. 25, (Feb. 1985) (announcing use of "hedonic damages" in Section 1983
case); see also Blodgett, Hedonic Damages OK, 73 A.B.A. J. 21 (Nov. 1987)
(discussing Seventh Circuit affirmation of Sherrod on appeal); Smith, Hedonic
Damages in Wrongful Death Cases, 74 A.B.A. J. 70 (Sept. 1988) (discussing general
applicability of hedonic damages for all cases involving tortious death).
33. Hedonic Damages, supra note 6, at 326.
34. Rose v. Ford, 1937 App. Cas. 826.
35. Id. See also Hedonic Damages, supra note 6, at 327.
36. Hedonic Damages, supra note 6, at 327.
37. Law Reform (Misc. Provisions) Act, 1934, 24 & 25 Geo. 5, ch. 41, § 1,
reprinted in, 13 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 115 (3d ed. 1969). It provided
that any cause of action vesting in a victim prior to his death would survive and the
payments were to be made to the decedent's estate. See also Hedonic Damages, supra
note 6, at 327 n.32.
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case law following Rose v. Ford" to determine the vitality of the
concept in American jurisprudence. The English courts dealt with this
element of damages very cautiously. The cases which followed limited
the recovery for loss of life to a nominal amount.3 9 The Court of
Appeal in Gammell v. Wilson4Oindicated its difficulty with the concept
of valuing human life and set a ceiling of 1250 pounds as proper
compensation for such an injury. 4' The court also was of the opinion
that such recovery amounts should be uniform. 42 They thought this
would help them avoid the unnecessarily difficult exercise of assessing
the value of life in every case. 43 The Court of Appeal was upheld by
the House of Lords, but not without some hesitation." While affirming the lower court, the House of Lords directed Parliament to clear
up the confusion which existed as to the amount of damages which
4
should be awarded in these cases. 1
Following quickly upon the heels of the House of Lords' decision
in Gammell, Parliament abolished the awards for damages for loss
of expectation of life. 46 This was accomplished through its passage of
the Administration of Justice Act of 1982. 41 Thus, after a long history,
England herself has positioned hedonic damages within the pain and
suffering formula. Recovery for a truncated life is no longer possible
in Britain except as a factor to be considered by the English courts
when awarding damages for conscious pain and suffering."
In the United States, loss of life first appeared as a sidelight to
the damage calculus in the 1890s . 49 Since that time, the law of damages
in tort has evolved in a few jurisdictions to allow the awarding of
hedonic damages as a separate and distinct element in the damage
calculation. ° Today, approximately half of the states recognize recovery for loss of enjoyment of life in one form or another.5
38. Rose v. Ford, 1937 App. Cas. 826.
39. Hedonic Damages, supra note 6, at 327 n.34.
40. [1980] 2 All E.R. 557.
41. Id. at 567-68.
42. Id. See also Hedonic Damages, supra note 6, at 327 n.37.
43. See Hedonic Damages, supra note 6, at 327 n.37.
44. See Gammell v. Wilson, [1981] 2 All E.R. 557, 588, 590, 595; see also
Hedonic Damages, supra note 6, at 328 n.39.
45. Hedonic Damages, supra note 6, at 328.
46. See Administration of Justice Act, 1982, ch. 53, § 1, reprinted in 13
HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 542-45 (4th ed. 1985).
47. Id. See Hedonic Damages, supra note 6, at 328.
48. Hedonic Damages, supra note 6, at 328.
49. Loss of Enjoyment, supra note 8, at 965.
50. Id. See Thompson v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 621 F.2d 814, 824
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Three variations regarding appropriate application of hedonic
damages exist in the law of damages in the United States.5 2 The first
type can be called absolute rejection. It is the view of an extreme
minority of jurisdictions which reject any compensation for hedonic
losses in any fashion.53 The next can be termed the integrated view.
These jurisdictions consider loss of enjoyment of life to be a factor
in pain and suffering.14 Finally, there are those jurisdictions that
provide recovery for hedonic damages as separate and distinct from
pain and suffering."
For example, the Supreme Court of Connecticut has allowed
separate damages for loss of enjoyment of life. The court in Katsetos
v. Nolan16 held that "just damages" include, among other things,
"compensation for the destruction of [the plaintiff's] capacity to carry
on and enjoy life's activities in a way she would have done had she
lived . . . . 7 The court considered evidence of the decedent's age at
(6th Cir. 1980) (pain and suffering, permanent injuries, and impairment of enjoyment
of life are conceptually distinct categories of intangible damages), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1035 (1980); Power v. City of August, 191 F. 647, 655-56 (C.C.E.D. Ky. 1911)
(plaintiff was awarded damages for pain and suffering where the jury was allowed
to award damages on the basis of permanent injury other than to plaintiff's power
to earn or make money); Katsetos v. Nolan, 170 Conn. 637, 657, 368 A.2d 172, 183
(1976) ('"Just damages' include ... compensation for the destruction of ... capacity
to carry on and enjoy life's activities ... ."); Rice v. City of Council Bluffs, 125

Iowa 639, 642, 100 N.W. 506, 507 (1904) (jury was allowed to consider future pain
and suffering, including "mental anguish, the sense of loss and burden, the inconvenience and embarrassment which [plaintiff] can never escape .

. . ."

in determining

damage award); Mariner v. Marsden, 610 P.2d 6 (Wyo. 1980) (plaintiff awarded
damages for medical expenses, lost wages, injury to personal property, pain and
suffering-past and future-as well as loss of enjoyment of life); Hermes, Loss of
Enjoyment of Life - Duplication of Damages Versus Full Compensation, 63 N.D.L.
REV. 561, 576-87 (1987).

51. Loss of Enjoyment, supra note 8, at 966 n.11. See also 34 A.L.R.4th 293
(1984).
52. Id.at 967.
53. Id.
54. Id.See also McDougald v. Garber, 73 N.Y.2d 246, 249-52, 536 N.E.2d
372, 375-77, 538 N.Y.S.2d 937, 940-42 (1989) (returned loss of enjoyment of life
damage analysis to traditional placement within calculus for pain and suffering),
rev'g 135 A.D.2d 80, 524 N.Y.S.2d 192 (1988); Note, Establishing Recovery for Loss
of Enjoyment of Life Apart from Conscious Pain and Suffering: McDougald v.
Garber, 62 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 332, 333 n.5 (1988) [hereinafter EstablishingRecovery].
55. Establishing Recovery, supra note 54, at 334 n.6. See also Loss of Enjoyment, supra note 8, at 967.
56. 170 Conn. 637, 368 A.2d 172 (1976).
57. Id. at 183. In Katsetos, the court was considering a wrongful death action
stemming from a doctor's medical malpractice. Hedonic Damages, supra note 6, at
329.

1989:37]

HEDONIC DAMAGES

the time of her death, life expectancy, marital status, number of
children, general disposition, health, and other life activities in which
she was involved.5 8 The court there recognized that the destruction of
life is compensable under Connecticut's wrongful death tort law.5 9
Some federal courts have also begun to allow awards for loss of
enjoyment of life in deprivation of life cases arising under Section
6
19 83 . 0 These courts have made conceptual distinctions between pain
and suffering and loss of the enjoyment of life. They have also
indicated that not allowing recovery for loss of life in a death case
thwarts the purposes underlying Section 1983.61 Further, by allowing
separate hedonic damages, these courts have attempted to avoid the
seemingly anomalous result whereby a greater award is possible to a
surviving victim for future pain and suffering than to a victim who
dies as a result of the unconstitutional deprivation.
In Part IV, this article discusses the decisions which have allowed
separate hedonic damage awards in Section 1983 cases, and questions
whether courts which have used deterrence as the basis for awarding
hedonic damages have been circumventing the Court's instructions in
Carey v. Piphus62 and Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura.63 This article considers the assertion that, to fulfill the purposes
of Section 1983, hedonic damages should provide compensation that
would otherwise not be available under state tort law.6 Part IV
58. Katsetos v. Nolan, 170 Conn. 637, 655, 368 A.2d 172, 184 (1976).
59. See id.at 183.
60. See, e.g., Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1240; Sherrod v. Berry,

827 F.2d 195, 205-06 (7th Cir. 1987), rev'd on other grounds on reh'g and remanded,

856 F.2d 802 (1988); Guyton v. Phillips, 532 F. Supp. 1154, 1167-68 (N.D. Cal.
1981); Roman v. City of Richmond, 570 F. Supp. 1554, 1557 (N.D. Cal. 1983); Bass
v. Wallenstein, 769 F.2d 1173, 1190 (7th Cir. 1985); O'Connor v. Several Unknown
Correctional Officers, 523 F. Supp. 1345, 1349 (E.D. Va. 1981).
61. Bell, 746 F.2d at 1240; Guyton, 532 F. Supp. at 1167; Roman, 570 F.
Supp. at 1557; Bass, 769 F.2d at 1190; O'Connor, 523 F. Supp. at 1349. Cf. Sherrod
v. Berry, 629 F. Supp. 159 (N.D. Ill. 1985), aff'd, 827 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1987) rev'd
on other grounds on reh'g and remanded, 856 F.2d 802 (1988). Sherrod reevaluates
the theory for hedonic damages and avoids the use of deterrence terminology. This
aspect of Sherrod is discussed more fully infra at pages 51-52.
62. 435 U.S. 247, 254-57 (1978) (cardinal principle of damages is compensation
for the injury caused to the plaintiff, and Section 1983's deterrent effect can be
accomplished through compensatory awards).
63. 477 U.S. 299, 306 (1986) (the StachuraCourt reaffirmed the Carey directive
that deterrence is effectuated through compensatory damages). See also Comment,
Presumed Damages and ConstitutionalInterests Under Section 1983, 58 U. CoLo. L.
REv. 293, 294 n.7 (1987).

64. See, e.g., Guyton, 532 F. Supp. at 1167.
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submits that this proposition is also violative of the spirit of Carey
and Stachura.
IV.
A.

PROPER COMPENSATION IN SECTION

1983

CASES

WHAT IS PAIN AND SUFFERING?

Proper compensation in Section 1983 actions for wrongful deprivation of life is determined generally with reference to the state's
wrongful death and survival remedies. 65 "These remedies include a
decedent's lost future earnings, pain and suffering prior to death,
medical expenses incurred prior to death and funeral expenses, and a
decedent's survivors' loss of the decedent's companionship, love and
affection."" Very few courts have allowed damages for hedonic losses
as a separate element of wrongful death recovery; most provide for
these losses within the framework of pain and suffering. 67 Those
courts that have awarded separate hedonic damages did so generally
in the same way. More or less, they indicated that they found a
conceptual difference between hedonic damages and conscious pain
68
and suffering.

"The cardinal principle of damages in Anglo-American law is
that of compensation for the injury caused to plaintiff by defendant's
breach of duty."'69 Damages are meant to compensate the victim, not
65. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).
66. Hedonic Damages, supra note 6, at 336-37.
67. Id.at 337.
68. See Thompson v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 621 F.2d 814, 824 (6th
Cir. 1980) (pain and suffering, permanent injuries, and impairment of enjoyment of
life are conceptually distinct categories of intangible damages), cert. denied 449 U.S.
1035 (1980); Power v. City of Augusta, 191 F. 647, 655-56 (C.C.E.D. Ky. 1911)
(plaintiff was awarded damages for pain and suffering where the jury was allowed
to award damages on the basis of permanent injury other than to plaintiff's power
to earn or make money); Katsetos v. Nolan, 170 Conn. 637, 657, 368 A.2d 172, 183
(1976) ('Just damages' include ... compensation for the destruction of ... capacity
to carry on and enjoy life's activities .

. .

."); Rice v. City of Council Bluffs, 125

Iowa 639, 642, 100 N.W. 506, 507 (1904) (jury was allowed to consider future pain
and suffering, including "mental anguish, the sense of loss and burden, the inconvenience and embarrassment which [plaintiff] can never escape ....

."

in determining

damage award); Mariner v. Marsden, 610 P.2d 6 (Wyo. 1980) (plaintiff awarded
damages for medical expenses, lost wages, injury to personal property, pain and
suffering-past and future-as well as loss of enjoyment of life).
69. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254-55 (1978) (quoting 2 F. HARPER &
F. JONES, LAW OF TORTS § 25.1, at 1299 (1956) (emphasis in original)); see also

Carey, 435 U.S. at 254-55 n.7 (citing D. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 3, at 135-38
(1973); C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF DAMAGES § 1 (1935); W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS §

2, at 7 (4th ed. 1971)).
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punish the wrongdoer.70 The purpose for recovery in tort is to put
the injured party in the same position he would have been in had
there been no tort. 7' The law of torts can only accomplish this, with
regard to noneconomic losses, by providing monetary awards. So the
legal fiction was adopted that money can compensate for pain and
72
suffering.
The terms pain and suffering have been defined a number of
ways. Neither lends itself to easy definition, and both are based on
subjective standards. One commentator has indicated that the concept
of "pain and suffering" is best understood by its elements. 73 Professor
Minzer, in her treatise, identifies the elements of pain and suffering
as including physical pain, mental suffering emanating from the
awareness of the pain, and mental anguish resulting from the unpleasant consequences of the deprivation. 74 Another definition of pain is
that it is "that specific bodily sensation which is commonly evoked
by a variety of different forms of energy intense enough to injure the
body at least minimally or transiently. ' 75 Suffering is just as difficult
to confine to specific terms. "[Sluffering is a mood in which anxiety/
depression predominates. There is no suffering without anxiety/deembodies those emotional consepression." ' 76 Suffering generally
77
injury.
physical
the
of
quences
There is no doubt that some distinguishing characteristics can be
found between the concepts of pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life. 78 Word choice and usage play a major role in those
distinctions. "If the term 'suffering' is limited to the emotional
response of the sensation of pain, then the emotional response caused
by the limitation of life's activities may be considered qualitatively
79
different."
70. McDougald, 73 N.Y.2d at 253-54, 536 N.E.2d at 374, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 939.

71. Id. at 254, 536 N.E.2d at 374, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 939 (1989), rev'g 135
A.D.2d 80, 524 N.Y.S.2d 192 (1988).
72. Id. at 254, 536 N.E.2d at 374-75, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 939.
73. See Establishing Recovery, supra note 54, at 333 n.4.
74. 1 M. MINZER, DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 4.10, at 4-20. See also
EstablishingRecovery, supra note 54, at 333 n.4.
75. 4 L. CHAPMAN, COURTROOM MEDICINE § 2.05, at 2-6 (1988), cited in
EstablishingRecovery, supra note 54, at 333 n.4.
76. Establishing Recovery, supra note 54, at 333 n.4 (citing Koskoff, The
Nature of Pain and Suffering, 13 TRIAL, 21, 21-22 (July 1977)).
77. See EstablishingRecovery, supra note 54, at 333 n.4.
78. McDougald v. Garber, 73 N.Y.2d 246, 256, 536 N.E.2d 372, 376, 538
N.Y.S.2d 937, 941 (1989).

79. Id. (citing Loss of Enjoyment, supra note 8, at 969-73).
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But suffering need not be so limited-it can easily encompass
the frustration and anguish caused by the inability to participate in activities that once brought pleasure. Traditionally, by
treating loss of enjoyment of life as a permissible factor in
assessing pain and suffering, courts have given the term this
broad meaning. 0
In Carey, the Court stated that whatever deterrent purpose
Section 1983 embodies, it is operable only through compensation. 81
Yet, even had the Court announced in Carey that deterrence was a
main objective in enacting Section 1983, giving pain and suffering its
broadest possible definition does not detract from this goal. Suffering
should include the frustration involved in not being able to participate
in life's activities to the same extent as before the injury.
Needless to say, the deterrent effect of proper compensation in
Section 1983 cases is an important aspect of the civil rights statute.
In deprivation of life cases, courts point to the seemingly inappropriate
result of a deceased victim receiving less damages than a victim of a
deprivation of liberty as a basis for awarding hedonic damages.1 2
Courts have considered it anomalous to the protection of civil liberties
that a person who dies as a result of improper governmental action
should be awarded less compensation than one who survives. 3 To
that end, courts have awarded hedonic damages after a determination
that the state's tort law was ineffective in fulfilling the deterrent
objective of Section 1983.
The next section evaluates the assertion that only by awarding
hedonic damages separately from pain and suffering can the deterrent
purpose of Section 1983 be advanced. The analysis proceeds informed
by the announcements of the Court in Carey, Stachura, and Wilson
4
v. Garcia.1
B.

VIOLATIVE OF THE TEACHINGS OF CAREY

The force of the argument in support of a separate award of
hedonic damages is that such award would fulfill the deterrence
purposes of Section 1983.85 And courts have opined that, where

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id.
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 256-57 (1978).
See infra notes 105-107 and accompanying text.
E.g., Guyton v. Phillips, 532 F. Supp. 1154, 1167 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
471 U.S. 261 (1985).
See, e.g., Hedonic Damages, supra note 6.
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remedies are insufficient to fulfill a statute's purpose, courts are free
to fashion remedies to do S0.6
Courts are simply not free to create remedies at will. This is
especially true with respect to federal court actions. It is an inherent
power of Congress to fashion a tort remedy to protect persons suing
under the laws of the United States. 7 For a court to fashion remedies,
without respect to the guidelines established by Congress, is a prime
example of judicial legislation.88 This is true even where the Supreme
Court may have indicated that some common law tort remedies may
9
not provide a damage solution in every Section 1983 case.
Courts point to Section 1988 as authority for federal courts to
use federal common law to resolve conflicts between state law and
the purposes of a federal statute.9 This is how courts have been able
to award separate hedonic damages, rather than limit themselves to
the state's announced elements for recovery. Generally, federal courts
are allowed to use federal common law wherever the state's law is
9
insufficient or in conflict with a federal statute or the Constitution. '
For instance, in survival actions under California's survival statute,
pain and suffering cannot be awarded. 92 Therefore, the Federal District Court for the Northern District of California in Guyton v.
Phillips93 determined that the California statute was inconsistent with
the purposes of Section 1983.94 Likewise, the Guyton court held that
California's wrongful death statute, which did not allow recovery for
hedonic losses separately, was contrary to the "clear purpose of
Section 1983" 91 which it characterized as the "previent[ion of] abuse
of official acts that cause deprivation of rights." 96
86. See, e.g., Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir. 1984); Sherrod,
629 F. Supp. 159, 163-64 (N.D. Ill. 1985), aff'd, 827 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1987), rev'd
on other grounds on reh'g and remanded, 856 F.2d 802 (1988); Roman, 570 F. Supp.
1554, 1556-58 (N.D. Cal. 1983); Guyton, 532 F. Supp. at 1167-68.
87. Local No. 1 (ACA.) v. Int'l Bhd. Teamsters, 419 F. Supp. 263, 275 (E.D.
Pa. 1976).
88. See Williamson, Judicial Activism: Section 1983 and Antitrust Liability
Chill Decision Making by State and Local Officials, 6 HARv. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 149,
149-51 (1983).
89. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 258 (1978).
90. Guyton v. Phillips, 532 F. Supp. 1154, 1166 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (citing
Robertson v. Wegman, 436 U.S. 584 (1978)); Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 86 (3d
Cir. 1965).
91. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).
92. Guyton, 532 F. Supp. at 1166.
93. 532 F. Supp. 1154 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
94. Guyton v. Phillips, 532 F. Supp. 1154, 1166 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
95. See id.at 1167.
96. Id.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 10

In Carey v. Piphus, the Court made it quite clear, however, that
courts should attempt to find a common tort law analogy for a
constitutional deprivation in Section 1983 actions. 97 The Court observed that "the interests protected by a particular branch of the
common law of torts may parallel closely the interests protected by a
particular constitutional right. In such cases, it may be appropriate
to apply the tort rules of damages directly to the section 1983
action." ' 98 In those cases involving an unconstitutional deprivation of
life, we can see that the state laws governing wrongful death are quite
analogous. Therefore, no further fashioning of remedies by courts
should be contemplated. 99 Carey further noted:
In other cases, the interests protected by a particular constitutional right may not also be protected by an analogous
branch of the common law of torts. In those cases, the task
will be the more difficult one of adapting common-law rules
of damages to provide fair compensation for injuries caused
by the deprivation of a constitutional right.'°0
Thus, those courts which have read Carey to allow judicial
fashioning of damages in Section 1983 cases for deprivation of life
are being disingenuous to the spirit of the opinion. They are also
being unfaithful to the specific principles of federalism which are not
to be ignored, even in Section 1983 cases.10' Carey indicated that
Section 1983 was enacted to repair the damage which had already
occurred to the rights of individuals. The Court rejected the argument
that punishment was anything more than a by-product of proper
compensation. The following section emphasizes the punitive nature
of hedonic damages.
C.

HEDONIC DAMAGES: PUNISHMENT

In McDougald v. Garber,0 2 the plaintiff argued that the tortfeasor should compensate the victim for all the consequences flowing
from the defendant's actions. Both the Supreme Court, New York
97. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 258 (1978).
98. Id.

99. See id.

100. Id. (citations omitted).

101. For discussion of federalism and how it impacts Section 1983 damages see
infra notes 181-204 and accompanying text.
102. McDougald v. Garber, 132 Misc. 2d 457, 504 N.Y.S.2d 383 (1986), aff'd,
135 A.D.2d 80, 524 N.Y.S.2d 192 (1988), aff'd in part and remanded in part, 73

N.Y.2d 246, 536 N.E.2d 372, 538 N.Y.S.2d 937 (1989).
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County, and the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, agreed that loss
of enjoyment of life damages should flow from a claim for wrongful
death. l0 3 By awarding these damages, the court avoided the paradoxical result of awarding higher damages for injury and lower damages
for deprivation of life. °4 Although McDougald is not a Section 1983
case, the same arguments presented in McDougald, have been advanced and affirmed in Section 1983 cases where hedonic damages
°
have been awarded. 0 5 The courts in Guyton v. Phillips,' and Roman
107 specifically indicated that those officials who
v. City of Richmond,
to pay a greater amount than those
deprive a person of life 0ought
8
injury.1
who merely cause
In McDougald, the high court of New York specifically denounced this analysis. Writing for the court, Judge Wachtler indicated
that this reasoning is "rooted in a desire to punish" relative to the
amount of injury.' °9 The court went on to say, "However relevant
such retributive symmetry may be in the criminal law, it has no place
in the law of civil damages, at least in the absence of culpability
beyond mere negligence."" 0 This is precisely the point the Court in
Carey and Stachura enunciated with respect to Section 1983 actions.
Those cases made it clear that Section 1983 was to entitle plaintiffs
to compensation for deprivations of their civil rights. Deterrence was
to be served inherently by and through the compensation resulting
from a finding of liability."' The court in Sherrod conspicuously
avoided terming the hedonic damages as deterrent damages. Instead,
Judge Leighton focused on the decedent's actual loss of life and the
loss of the pleasure of living." 2 However, shifting the focus does not
change the nature of the thing.

103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See, e.g., Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1239 (7th Cir. 1984);
Guyton v. Phillips, 532 F. Supp. 1154, 1167 (N.D. Cal. 1981); Roman v. City of
Richmond, 570 F. Supp. 1554, 1557 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
106. 532 F. Supp. 1154, 1167 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
107. 570 F. Supp. 1554, 1557 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
108. Guyton v. Phillips, 532 F. Supp. 1154, 1167 (N.D. Cal. 1981); Roman v.
City of Richmond, 570 F. Supp. 1554, 1557 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
109. McDougald v. Garber, 73 N.Y.2d 246, 255, 536 N.E.2d 372, 375, 538
N.Y.S.2d 937, 940 (1989).
110. Id.
111. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 256-57 (1978).
112. Sherrod v. Berry, 629 F. Supp. 159, 163 (N.D. Ill. 1985), aff'd, 827 F.2d
195 (7th Cir. 1987), rev'd on other grounds on reh'g and remanded, 856 F.2d 802
(1988).
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The reality of Sherrod is that courts have the potential to grant
plaintiffs the same deterrent damages that they would otherwise not
be allowed to award. By using language that sounds compensatory,
they can avoid reversal through semantic twists. In fact, the damages
awarded under the title of hedonic damages actually serve to punish
the wrongdoer and deter future tortfeasors.II3 This is not only violative
of the spirit of Carey,"4 but it also undermines the purposes of Section
1983.115

Because these awards are punitive in nature, they have the
potential of resulting in excessive and duplicative recovery in particular
cases. This occurs when punitive damages are awarded because the
actor caused the deprivation through deliberate indifference, recklessness, gross negligence or some other mental state beyond mere negligence. In light of the circumstances surrounding Section 1983 actions,
punitive damages are always available for the plaintiffs to allege.,1 6
In Smith v. Wade,"' the Court held that punitive damages are
available in Section 1983 actions "when the defendant's conduct is
shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves
reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of
others.""' Smith should be read mindful of Parratt v. Taylor," 9 and
its progeny. 20 In Parratt,a case decided two years before Smith, the
Court dealt unsuccessfully with the question of the requisite mental
state in Section 1983 actions .'2 The Court's opinion read as if
negligence could be a legitimate basis upon which a Section 1983

40.

113. McDougald, 73 N.Y.2d at 255, 536 N.E. 2d at 375, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 939-

114. Carey, 435 U.S. at 254-57. The Court held that, although deterrence is an
important purpose of awarding damages for constitutional deprivations, it operates
through the mechanism of damages which are compensatory. Further, the Court
stated that damage awards under Section 1983 should be governed by the principle
of compensation. Id. The Court reaffirmed this holding in Memphis Community
School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1986). Thus, those courts which seek
to balance the damages with the amount of harm caused are punishing the wrongdoer,
regardless of how they label such measures. See supra notes 101-11 and accompanying
text.
115. Carey, 435 U.S. at 254-57.
116. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 35-36 (1983).
117. 461 U.S. 30 (1983).
118. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983).
119. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
120. E.g., Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474
U.S. 344 (1986).
121. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
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cause of action might be founded. 122 Read with that understanding,
Smith is correct when it specifically delineates those Section 1983
cases where punitive damages are available.
23
However, since the decisions in Daniels v. Williams' and Dav4 were announced, the question whether punitive
idson v. Cannon'2
damages are available to all plaintiffs in all Section 1983 cases has a
different result. 25 It was through both cases that the Court established
that Section 1983 cases alleging deprivation of an individual's fourteenth amendment due process rights could not succeed where founded
upon mere negligence. 126 The Daniels Court held "where a government
official's act causing injury to life, liberty, or property is merely
122. Id. at 536-37.

123. 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
124. Id.

125. Legal scholars both on and off the bench have, at different times, questioned the overall validity of punitive damage awards in any Section 1983 case. See,
e.g., Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 86 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Although a
topic of heated debate at present, it is one which will not be expounded upon in this
article.
126. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328, 333; Davidson v. Cannon, 474
U.S. 344, 347. However, we cannot and must not read Daniels and Davidson as an
all encompassing statement respecting Constitutional adjudication. For the language
used by then-Justice Rehnquist eliminates just such a scenario. We cannot ignore the
qualification in his opinion: "[In any given Section 1983 suit, the plaintiff must still
prove a violation of the underlying Constitutional right; and depending on the right,
merely negligent conduct may not be enough to state a claim." Daniels, 474 U.S. at
330 (emphasis supplied). Therefore, in cases involving violations of the Bill of Rights,
such as the fourth amendment's right to be free from unreasonable search and
seizure, the standards to be met by plaintiffs are to be found in the text of the
amendment itself.
In Daniels and Davidson, and cases of the same ilk, the courts are faced with
claims arising from the procedures which were used or should have been used to
protect one's life, liberty or property. It is in this context that Justice Rehnquist, for
the Court, asserted that particular Section 1983 claims cannot succeed if they are
founded on mere negligence.
Therefore, should a plaintiff allege a violation of his fourth amendment right to
be free from unreasonable searches, the standard laid out in that amendment controls.
Likewise, the same reasoning applies to any and all claims brought under the
Constitution and the laws of the United States or the several states. However, if no
standard is enunciated or is to be identified from the text, then the Daniels and
Davidson rules will necessarily apply when dealing with claims for the government's
failure to provide adequate procedures, either prior to or subsequent to a govenmental
deprivation of life, liberty or property. Thus, keeping in mind the focus of this
article-loss of life and/or liberty without due process of law-it is clear that Daniels
and Davidson control cases brought under Section 1983 for a deprivation of life,
liberty or property without due process.
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negligent, 'no procedure for compensation is constitutionally required.' '1 27 In dictum, the Court stated that "[h]istorically, this
guarantee of due process has been applied to deliberate decisions of
government officials to deprive a person of life, liberty or property." 1 2 Hence, reading the most recent pronouncements of the Court
on the constitutional footing of Section 1983 cases and calling to
mind Smith, one could argue that, if the Section 1983 claim is allowed
to proceed in federal court, the plaintiff will always have the potential
of recovering punitive damages. This can only be so because Section
1983 actions are only proper when based on more than plain negligence. 129 Beyond mere negligence, one can find recklessness, callous
indifference, gross negligence, deliberate, willful, knowing, or intentional states of mind. All are proper mental states for seeking punitive
damages, 30 not to mention their being appropriate bases for asserting
a Section 1983 claim.' Therefore, where one is deprived of his life
without due process, the damage award will often include a prayer
for punitive damages. This is logical, especially because life is one of
our society's most protected commodities. Thus, the purposes of
making the defendant pay on balance with the harm caused to the
victim can be accomplished through punitive damages rather than
through both punitive damages and hedonic damages. Hedonic damages are not the proper vehicle for deterrence.
Hedonic damages are also the wrong vehicle for compensation
to the decedent, if awarded separately from pain and suffering. As
delineated above, "the plaintiff's inability to enjoy life to its fullest
has been considered one type of suffering to be factored into a general
award for nonpecuniary damages, commonly known as pain and
suffering." 3 2 This was considered proper, especially regarding Section
1983 cases, because pain and suffering damages are awarded only for
conscious pain and suffering. This being so, the damages for pain
and suffering are truly compensatory to the plaintiff, because he was,
at some point in time, aware of his losses.' 33 Section 1983 was enacted
127. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 333 (quoting Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 548

(1981)).
128. Id. at 331.

129. Id. at 333.

130. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983).
131. See generally Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Davidson v.

Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986).
132. McDougald v. Garber, 73 N.Y.2d 246, 255-256, 536 N.E.2d 372, 375, 538
N.Y.S.2d 937, 940 (1989).
133. The federal survival rule overrides the state's laws in this respect, because
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to compensate the victim for his injuries which were caused by the
34
deprivation of his constitutional rights."
In cases where the victim is killed by unconstitutional activity,
the damages for hedonic loss are recoverable, under a particular line
of cases, to the decedent's estate. Thus, the damages do not inure to
the injured party's benefit. Rather, they create a windfall for third
parties. In so doing, these damages become punitive rather than
compensatory.' In Rufino v. United States, 36 the Second Circuit
refused to accept this argument. There the court maintained that the
beneficiary of the damage award was insignificant in determining
whether the award is compensatory or punitive. 3 7 Because the Rufino
court was anticipating the direction of the New York law on tort
damages, it is compelling to note a subsequent decision of New York's
highest court on the issue of loss of enjoyment of life damages.
In McDougald v. Garber, the Court of Appeals for the state of
New York decided the issue of whether the plaintiff must have some3
cognitive awareness in order for the damages to be compensatory.'
The court held that at least some cognition is required before recovery
for loss of enjoyment of life can attach.' 39 Relying on Flannery v.
United States,'40 the court wrote:
[An award of money damages in such circumstances has no
meaning or utility to the injured person. An award for the
loss of enjoyment of life 'cannot provide [such a victim] with
He
any consolation or ease any burden resting on him ....
He cannot
cannot spend it upon necessities or pleasures.
4
experience the pleasure of giving it away."1 '
to disallow such damages would thwart the purposes of Section 1983. See supra notes
91-96 and accompanying text. The legitimacy of this position is beyond the scope of
discussion here.
134. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See also Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
135. Flannery v. United States, 718 F.2d 108, 111 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
467 U.S. 1226 (1984). In Flannery, the court was dealing with a comatose plaintiff.
The counsel for the plaintiff had argued that cognition was not necessary for loss of
life damages. The court agreed with the defendant's position and held that, if the

hedonic damages are "compensatory at all, 'it is compensatory to those relatives who
will survive him."' Id., cited in Establishing Recovery, supra note 54, at 343 n.46.
136. 829 F.2d 354, 362 (2d Cir. 1987) (predicting the future of New York law).
137. Id. See also EstablishingRecovery, supra note 54, at 343 n.47.
138. McDougald v. Garber, 73 N.Y.2d 246, 254, 536 N.E.2d 372, 374, 538
N.Y.S.2d 937, 939 (1989).

139. Id. at 255, 536 N.E.2d at 375, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 940.

140. 718 F.2d 108 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1226 (1984).
141. McDougald, 73 N.Y.2d at 254, 536 N.E.2d at 375, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 939
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Dean Calabresi has also indicated his confusion as to the propriety
of the concept. He has stated, "It doesn't make terribly much sense
to give an award to someone for loss of enjoyment of life when that
1' 42
person is already dead.
In addition to the punitive nature of hedonic damages, they also
result in duplicative recovery for the plaintiff's estate and create a
windfall to the decedent's survivors. 43 This aspect of this remedy is
discussed below.
D.

HEDONIC DAMAGES: DUPLICATIVE RECOVERY AND WINDFALL
PROFIT

The contention that hedonic damages are duplicative is met with
the argument that the estate stands in the place of the decedent to
collect his debts and, therefore, separate hedonic damages should be
rightfully granted. '44 Further, it is asserted that the decedent is entitled
to money damages for the unconstitutional deprivation of life.145
Finally, it is argued that an award for hedonic damages ensures that
money damages owed to the decedent are paid to him through his
estate only because he is no longer alive to collect them himself.' 46
Survival cases are pointed to as support for this argument.1 47
The survival cases are not controlling in deprivation of life cases,
however. The logic underlying the survival cases and the legitimacy
of the estate collecting for the now dead victim has no application
when discussing whether the estate should be allowed to collect the
damages for the decedent's hedonic losses. In a survival action, the
victim has been injured and is aware of his injuries and his chances
for survival stemming from those injuries. It would be irresponsible
of the courts to allow his claim to abate simply because he had died
subsequent to the claim accruing. This result would truly be contrary
(quoting Flannery v. United States, 718 F.2d 108, 111 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
467 U.S. 1226 (1984)).
142. Blodgett, Hedonic Damages, 71 A.B.A. J. 25 (Feb. 1985) (citing Guido
Calabresi, Dean, Yale Law School).
143. But see Loss of Enjoyment, supra note 8, and Hedonic Damages, supra
note 6, for a discussion on the benefits derived from separate hedonic and punitive
damage awards in Section 1983 actions.
144. See Hedonic Damages, supra note 6, at 337.
145. Id. at 337-38.
146. Id. at 338.
147. In survival actions under Section 1983, a plaintiff can recover all those
damages he had coming to him which inured to his benefit prior to his death. In
other words, his death does not abate the claim. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
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to the purposes of Section 1983.148 However, this is not to say that
the injured victim's estate should recover damages for which the
injured individual was not aware. Loss of enjoyment of life damages
should again be part of the pain and suffering formula and should
reflect the lasting nature of the harm caused. In a deprivation of life
case, the victim has no cognition of his injuries once he has died. He
can, however, recover for those injuries of which he was aware prior
to death.
To that extent the deprivation of life case is much like a deprivation of liberty claim. The difference between the two claims results
in the jury's factual knowledge of the permanency of the harm caused
by the unconstitutional activity in the life case. The jury should take
into account the lasting nature of the injuries inflicted upon the
plaintiff. To this end, a person who is aware of his injuries will likely
know the extent and the prognosis of those injuries. Likewise, a
person who has died can be assumed to have been cognizant prior to
death of the life threatening situation into which he has been placed.
Juries have traditionally assessed the permanence of the injuries
caused and have compensated for them in pain and suffering awards.
They should not now be required to engage in the mental gymnastics
which a separation of the factors would demand. We cannot be
assured that separation of the factors will result in figures for each
factor that are exclusive of amounts already considered and compensated in the other. Therefore, the figures that result can be unavoidably duplicative and excessive. The heirs of the deceased will have
their own actions for which they can recover, among other things,
loss of society, love, and affection. The deceased's estate will recover
the damages assessed for medical care, lost income, funeral expenses,
and conscious pain and suffering. An additional, separate award for
hedonic losses will just serve to repeat those already granted and
enrich the estate beyond its due recovery.
The argument has been made that the plaintiff is entitled to
hedonic damages in civil rights deprivation of life cases because the
Constitution protects life.149 The argument continues by stating that
Section 1983 life cases, even though comparable to wrongful death
cases, are much more than a simple tort. It is further argued that to
deprive an individual of life without due process is contrary to
148. See Guyton v. Phillips, 532 F. Supp. 1154, 1165-66 (N.D. Cal. 1981). For
an explanation of the purposes of Section 1983, see supra notes 13-29 and accompanying text.
149. See generally Hedonic Damages, supra note 6; Loss of Enjoyment, supra
note 8; Blodgett, Hedonic Damages OK, supra note 32.
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everything that our society considers central to our sense of ordered
liberty. '50 This argument purports to compensate the victim more fully
than he otherwise would have been under the state's tort law. This,
they argue, is proper because of the importance of the claim, not
only to the plaintiff, but also to the advancement and flourishing of
our constitutional democracy.III It attempts to reach a balance between
injury and damages. 52 The thrust of that argument is couched in
terms with which no one could reasonably quarrel. However, it is the
basic principle underlying the argument that does not comport with
our notion of fairness. The advocates of hedonic damages are tempted
by their sense of equity, but, after closer analysis, this "temptation
is rooted in a desire to punish the defendant in proportion to the
harm inflicted."' 53 Because punishment in Section 1983 cases is allowed where the deprivation resulted from actions beyond mere
negligence, and in those cases punitive damages may be awarded, the
recovery for loss of enjoyment of life, separately, would again be
duplicative and excessive. Thus, courts allowing separate damages for
loss of enjoyment of life are expanding Section 1983 beyond its
purpose.
Some direction from the Supreme Court on this issue could
clarify the nature of the damages and their purposes, especially in
relation to Section 1983. After all, one explanation for Section 1983,
in coordination with Section 1988, is to provide a uniform system of
redress for unconstitutional deprivations of one's constitutional rights.
Uniformity is one of the underlying reasons that courts have begun
to award hedonic damages. The following section therefore will
explore the theory of uniformity in the Section 1983 damages analysis.
E.

UNIFORMITY AND SECTION 1983

It has been argued that Section 1983's protections were not
intended by Congress to differ from state to state. 154 Thus, the
damages to be awarded should be determined according to the federal
common law.'" Further, the damages calculation must fulfill the
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. McDougald v. Garber, 73 N.Y.2d 246, 255, 536 N.E.2d 372, 375, 538
N.Y.S.2d 937, 940 (1989).
153. Id.
154. Busche v. Burkee, 649 F.2d 509, 518 (7th Cir. 1981) (protections of Section
1983 are intended to be uniform), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981).
155. Id.
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statute's underlying purposes.15 6 In light of the mandate of 42 U.S.C.
Section 1988, however, the federal common law regarding damages
must also be informed by the state's tort law concerning damages.
Therefore, the federal court hearing the case adopts the law of
damages of the state in which it sits.
It has been urged that there is a difference between those rights
protected by state tort law and Section 1983. To this end, it is argued
that hedonic damages fulfill the deterrent purposes of Section 1983.117
In furtherance of this objective, courts have opined that where
remedies are insufficient to fulfill the statute's purpose courts are free
'
to fashion remedies to accomplish it. 58 The arguments in favor of
awarding separate hedonic damages are based on the value of uniform
protection of constitutional rights. One of the most attractive and
subtle arguments that is put forward by advocates of consistent
application of hedonic damages stems from the fact that one state
may allow separate hedonic recovery and another will not. New York,
59
for example, does not allow separate recovery for loss of life, but
60 The type of uniformity being sought, however,
Connecticut does.1
is not the exact nature of available damages. Rather, it is the uniformity of expectation and rights which is at the center of the discussion.16

The law in Connecticut with respect to the proper division of the
elements of damages seems to be misplaced.162 Both California and

156. Id.

157. See generally Hedonic Damages, supra note 6.

158. See, e.g., Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1239 (7th Cir. 1984);
Sherrod v. Berry, 629 F. Supp. 159, 163-64 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Roman v. City of
Richmond, 570 F. Supp. 1554, 1556-58 (N.D. Cal. 1983); Guyton v. Phillips, 532 F.
Supp. 1154, 1167-68 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
159. McDougald v. Garber, 73 N.Y.2d 246, 536 N.E.2d 372, 538 N.Y.S.2d 937
(1989).
160. Katsetos v. Nolan, 170 Conn. 637, 368 A.2d 172 (1976).
161. For a more detailed discussion on the issue of uniformity, see infra notes
162-180 and accompanying text.
162. Hoskie v. United States, 666 F.2d 1353 (10th Cir. 1981) (New Mexico: loss
of enjoyment of life is a component of pain and suffering); Huff v. Tracy, 57 Cal.
App. 3d 939, 129 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1976) (California: enjoyment of life damages
duplicate pain and suffering); Long v. Yellow Cab Co., 137 Ill. App. 3d 324, 484
N.E.2d 830 (1985) (Illinois: hedonic damages part of pain and suffering calculus);
Poyzer v. McGraw, 360 N.W.2d 748 (Iowa 1985) (Iowa: loss of enjoyment of life is
a factor within pain and suffering analysis); Leiker v. Gafford, 245 Kan. 325, 778
P.2d 823 (1989) (Kansas: loss of enjoyment of life is not a separate category of
nonpecuniary damages); Swiler v. Baker's Supermarket, Inc., 203 Neb. 183, 277
N.W.2d 697 (1979) (Nebraska: award for loss of enjoyment of life is a part of
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New York, traditionally the states on the cutting edge of tort law,
refuse to separate hedonic damages from pain and suffering. 63 Advocates of hedonic damages had hoped that the New York case of
McDougald v. Garberwould advance their position. Many anticipated
that this lower court decision '64 would be affirmed by New York's
high court and thus pave the way for greater damages in wrongful
death cases. By a vote of 5-2, however, the New York Court of
Appeals abolished any distinction between pain and suffering and loss
of enjoyment of life. 165 The court, citing other jurisdictions,166 refused
permanent disability and pain and suffering); McDougald v. Garber, 73 N.Y.2d 246,

536 N.E.2d 372, 538 N.Y.S.2d 937 (1989) (New York: loss of enjoyment of life

damages placed squarely within pain and suffering); Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Lane,
720 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (Texas: loss of enjoyment is not a separate
element of damages but may be included within pain and suffering or general
damages); Judd v. Rowley's Cherry Hill Orchards, Inc., 611 P.2d 1216 (Utah 1980)
(Utah: loss of enjoyment of life to be factored within pain and suffering); Flannery
v. United States, 297 S.E.2d 433 (W. Va. 1982), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1226 (1984)
(West Virginia: separate awards for loss of enjoyment of life are duplicative of other
categories of damages); Gammell v. Wilson, [1980] 2 All E.R. 557. But see Rufino
v. United States, 829 F.2d 354, 362 (2d Cir. 1987) (predicting New York would
recognize hedonic damages); Thompson v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 621 F.2d
814, 824 (6th Cir. 1980) (loss of life and pain and suffering are different elements),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1035 (1980); Pierce v. New York Cent. R.R., 409 F.2d 1392,
1398-99 (6th Cir. 1969) (not reversible error to award separate damages for pain and
suffering and loss of life); Mariner v. Marsden, 610 P.2d 6, 12 (Wyo. 1980) (can
award either separately or combined). See also EstablishingRecovery, supra note 54,
at 334 n.6; Bell, 746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1984); Sherrod v. Berry, 827 F.2d 195 (7th
Cir. 1987), rev'd on other grounds on reh'g and remanded, 856 F.2d 802 (1988) (both
Section 1983 actions awarding separate damages for pain and suffering and loss of
life). See also Administration of Justice Act, 1982, Ch. 53, § 1, reprinted in 13
HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND, 542-45 (4th ed. 1985) (combining loss of expectation of life damages within pain and suffering calculus)
163. California: Huff v. Tracy, 57 Cal. App. 3d 939, 129 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1976);
New York: McDougald v. Garber, 73 N.Y.2d 246, 536 N.E.2d 372, 538 N.Y.S.2d
937 (1989). See Loss of Enjoyment, supra note 8, at 965 (1981), for a general
discussion and criticism of California's treatment of loss of life damages. The
development of California's tort law with regard to its refusal to make any distinctions
between pain and suffering and hedonic damages is a topic for another article. The
scope of this article is limited specifically to the application of hedonic damages in
Section 1983 "Life" cases.
164. 132 Misc. 2d 457, 504 N.Y.S.2d 383 (1986), aff'd, 524 N.Y.S.2d 192, 135
A.D.2d 80 (1988).
165. McDougald v. Garber, 73 N.Y.2d 246, 257, 536 N.E.2d 372, 377, 538
N.Y.S.2d 937, 942 (1989).
166. Huff, 57 Cal. App. 3d at 939, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 551; Poyzer v. McGraw,
360 N.W.2d 748 (Iowa 1985).
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which integrated hedonic
to depart from the traditional approach
167
suffering.
and
pain
damages and
With respect to Section 1983 actions, another disparity in application of federal law occurs when courts look to an individual state's
statute of limitations. The Supreme Court has held in Wilson v.
Garcia, that courts were to look to a state's personal injury law to
determine the appropriate length of time that a claim should be
viable. 68 The Court indicated that Section 1983 actions were best
understood as sounding in tort 169 and therefore, the applicable statutes
of limitations are those that the state has established for personal
1 70
injury actions.
The Supreme Court refrained from announcing a specific time
period in which plaintiffs must bring their Section 1983 suits, and
instead left it to the state legislatures to determine the appropriate
time period.' 71 In so doing, the Supreme Court managed to strike a
balance between the uniform application of laws and the appropriate
deference to the state's policies and tradition with regard to an72
important aspect of litigation. In Johnson v. Railway Express Agency,
the Court explained Congress' decision to borrow the state's statute
of limitation:
Although any statute of limitation is necessarily arbitrary, the
length of the period allowed for instituting suit inevitably
reflects a value judgment concerning the point at which the
interests in favor of protecting valid claims are outweighed by
the interest in prohibiting prosecution of stale ones. . . . In
borrowing a state period of limitation for application to a
federal cause of action, a federal court is relying on the State's
wisdom in setting a limit . . .on the prosecution of a closely

analogous claim.

7

'

The authority for federal courts to refer to other laws for the
74
proper Section 1983 limitation period is based upon Section 1988.1

167. McDougald, 73 N.Y.2d at 256-57, 536 N.E.2d at 376, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 940.

168. 471 U.S. 261, 279 (1985).
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 277 (1985).
Id. at 279.
Id.
421 U.S. 454 (1975).
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 463-64 (1975).

174. Kibble-Smith, Statutes of Limitations and Section 1983: Implications for
Illinois Civil Rights Law, 20 J. MARSHALL L. Rlv. 415, 416 (1987).
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The same is true for damages.' 75 Although Section 1983 provides a
cause of action for deprivations of constitutional rights, it does not
include rules for decision with respect to damages. Thus, where the
federal law, here Section 1983, is silent as to any aspect of the claim
being advanced, then Section 1988 mandates use of the forum state's
whole tort law to fill in the interstices of the federal law. 7 6 So, much
the same way the Court reasoned its opinion with respect to applicable
statutes of limitation, federal courts are analytically required to follow
the law of the state in which they sit when awarding damages in civil
rights cases. "Congress of course could have, by specific provision,
prescribed a limitation, but no specific provision [was] adduced.' 1 77
The Supreme Court has consistently interpreted Section 1988 as
instructing that the rule applicable to the analogous state claim shall
furnish the rule of decision "so far as the same is not inconsistent
with the Constitution and the laws of the United States.' 1 78
Uniformity, then, is achieved whereby each case will be treated
according to the common law of the state wherein the case is being
heard. One might inquire how such a difference in the damages
awarded or the limitations placed upon a cause of action could ever
possibly amount to uniformity. However, the type of uniformity
which Congress meant to achieve must be the focus of the inquiry, 179
and this is what federal courts should analyze rather than the exacting
nature of damages. Congress realized that citizens of certain jurisdictions had particular expectations, especially with regard to tort recovery. Congress must also have realized that not all states' tort damages
calculi provided for the same compensatory scheme. Therefore, the
uniformity argument only goes so far. There is uniformity to the
extent that citizens of New York, for example, can recover for Section
1983 wrongful death according to the laws of New York. Likewise a
citizen of Connecticut can recover for the same deprivation according
to the laws of Connecticut. Uniformity is not minimized through the
adoption of the state damages law regarding wrongful death in Section
1983 cases claiming deprivation of life. 180
175. See supra note 6 and accompanying text; supra notes 21-29 and accompanying text.
176. Accord Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 258 (1978).
177. O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U.S. 318, 322-23 (1914). See also Ford Motor
Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 565 (1980) ("caution must temper judicial
creativity in the face of legislative silence").
178. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 281 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
179. Anton v. Lehpamer, 787 F.2d 1141, 1145 (7th Cir. 1986) (discussing the
uniform application of statutes of limitations in Section 1983 claims).
180. Id.
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The question arises as to whether this is just and fair compensation to the New York citizen under Section 1983. The answer to that
question brings us to the theory of expectation and meaningful
compensation. If the New York citizen recovers everything he could
under New York's law, then he has been fully compensated according
to his expectations. There is no reason to afford him greater, possibly
duplicative, compensation merely because he was a victim of a tort
perpetrated by a government tortfeasor. Were he victimized by a
purely private tortfeasor, hedonic damages would not be allowed
separately. There is no reason to compensate him in a Section 1983
action for elements that he would be unable to recover in a private
tort case.
The argument that both citizens should be able to recover an
element of damages not recognized by their state's common law has
two faults. First, reasons why an individual should be allowed to
recover for hedonic losses simply because he was killed by a government actor are ill-founded. Because he had only the expectation of
recovery provided by the common law of his state were he to be
injured by another's tortious conduct, that is all he should be allowed
to recover. To this end, compensating plaintiffs according to the
elements of damages which are provided by the state's common law
amounts to full and meaningful compensation for the plaintiff. Second, to allow a plaintiff to recover for damages not recognized by
the situs' common law insults that state's sensibilities. In those cases,
the federal government is in effect saying that this state is poorly
compensating its -own citizens in tort cases between purely private
parties. This author contends that such was not the intention of the
framers of Section 1988.
The intentions of Congress, as well as the policies of the various
states, must be kept in mind when courts award damages in Section
1983 actions. Hedonic damages and the applicable principles of
federalism are discussed in the next section.
V.

HEDONIC DAMAGES AND FEDERALISM

The drafters of Section 1983, it can be argued, were little concerned about being deferential to local sensibilities. They could be
said to have been fully aware of the Section's intrusiveness in dealing
with local legislatures and courts. Section 1983 was enacted, however,
in a state of emergency.1 81 The crises of those times have fortunately
181. Nichol, Federalism, State Courts, and Section 1983, 73 VA. L. REv. 959,
984 (1987).
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departed and "the exigencies of Reconstruction no longer exist.' '1 2
Courts should, in any case, respect the intent of the Congress whenever
applying the law in Section 1983 actions.18 3
What can be seen from Section 1983 itself is that it is devoid of
any mention of rules for decision with regard to damages.'8 4 Section
1988 provides, however, that where the federal law is deficient, the
law of the state wherein the court is sitting should apply, except when
it conflicts with the United States Constitution and federal statutes." 5
Although difficult in its application, Section 1988 "does at least
indicate that judges, in measuring the demands of Section 1983, are
not simply to make it up as they go."'' 8 6
In cases where judges have been awarding hedonic damages
separately from pain and suffering, 8 7 this is exactly what has been
occurring. Judges have been ignoring not only the wishes of Congress,
but also the dictates of the Supreme Court as announced in Carey.
The Court made it quite clear that, where a common law tort analogue
is available, the law of that analogue should be applied directly to
the Section 1983 case with which the lower court is dealing. In Guyton,
the court was dealing with the deprivation of life in a Section 1983
action. 88 There, the court misread Carey and broadened its holding
illegitimately. Guyton misapprehended the Supreme Court's dictum
that in some cases, "common-law tort rules of damages will [notj
provide a complete solution to the damages issue in every Section
1983 case."' 8 9 The Carey Court had indicated that this was true in
those cases where constitutional rights cannot be analogized with torts
found at common law.190 The courts in Roman v. City of Richmond'9'
explicitly, and by implication in Bell v. City of Milwaukee'92 and

text.

182.
183.
184.
185.

Id.
Williamson, supra note 88, at 149.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 ('1982); see also supra notes 21-29 and accompanying

186. Nichol, supra note 181, at 992.
187. See, e.g., Guyton v. Phillips, 532 F. Supp. 1154 (N.D. Cal. 1981); Sherrod
v. Berry, 629 F. Supp. 159 (N.D. Ill. 1985), aff'd, 827 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1987),
rev'd on other grounds on reh'g and remanded, 856 F.2d 802 (1988); Bell v. City of
Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1984); Roman v. City of Richmond, 570 F.
Supp. 1554 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
188. See Guyton v. Phillips, 532 F. Supp. 1154 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
189. Id. at 1167 (quoting Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 427, 258 (1978)).
190. Carey, 435 U.S. at 257.
191. 570 F. Supp. at 1557.
192. 746 F.2d 1205 (1984).
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Sherrod v. Berry, 193 took the same liberties with this language in
Carey. They have used this language to further their own beliefs;
beliefs not founded in legal principle.
The courts facing the issue of hedonic damages should pay heed
to the legislative history of Section 1983 which "demonstrates that it
was intended to '[create] a species of tort liability."'194 Further, courts
should be mindful that:
[O]ver the centuries the common law of torts has developed a
set of rules to implement the principle that a person should
be compensated fairly for injuries caused by the violation of
his legal rights. These rules, defining the elements of damages
and the prerequisites for their recovery, provide the appropriate starting point for the inquiry under Section 1983 as well. 195
"[I]t is necessary to incorporate some key aspects of deference to
local [sensibilities] into the Section 1983 cause of action regardless of
the [otherwise intrusive] attitudes of the framers."196 As Justice Brandeis noted in 1932, "one of the happy incidents of the federal system
[is] that a courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without
''
risk to the rest of the country. 197
The concept expressed is that, if an idea works, there is a
probability that other states may adopt that same approach. 98 When
a national standard is mandated by the Supreme Court, further
exploration of alternative approaches can never succeed.199 This deferent approach to the wisdom of the states has been followed by
application of state statutes of limitation, which have been infused
into the law of Section 1983 by virtue of Section 1988.200 If courts
defer to the policy considerations of the state to determine the
appropriate statute of limitation, then so should courts defer to the
reasoning of the state that only allows hedonic damages as a factor
193. 629 F. Supp. 159 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
194. Carey, 435 U.S. at 253.
195. Id. at 257-58.
196. Nichol, supra note 181, at 999.
197. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting), quoted in Maltz, Individual Rights and State Autonomy, 12 HAiv. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y. 163, 183 (1989) [hereinafter Individual Rights].
198. Individual Rights, supra note 197, at 183.
199. Id.
200. See, e.g., Pegues v. Morehouse Parish School Bd., 632 F.2d 1279 (5th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981) (for applicable statute of limitations, courts
look to the state law in which case is brought).
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in pain and suffering. Judges should not be free to circumvent the
long tradition embodied in the state common law, in order to facilitate
their own individual sense of fairness and equity.
[R]ecognition of the importance of state autonomy allows
people who hold values not generally favored nationally to
effectuate their preferences by joining with other like-minded
individuals to form communities governed by those values.
Further, the principles of federalism suggest that the members
of these local communities have a right to keep their value
judgments undisturbed by the Supreme Court-a powerful
national governing body. 201
Federal judges have been removed from the political mainstream
to avoid this very possibility. 20 2 Our judges should be cautious in their
attempts to provide recovery. They should abide by the legal principles
20 3
set before them and not by public or personal emotional sentiment.
The awards for hedonic losses are nothing more than the judge's
personal outrage at the events bringing the case before him. In the
judiciary's attempt to uniformly protect civil rights, it is overstepping
its Constitutional authority. The courts that have awarded hedonic
damages were concerned about underenforcement of the citizenry's
rights. "[R]ather than resulting in underenforcement of rights, the
suggested approach should be viewed as a necessary product of the
complex interrelationship between the federal courts and the other
agencies of government in the American system.'204 Therefore, federal
courts should be mindful of the policies established in the state's
wrongful death damages law that refuses to allow damages for hedonic
losses separately from pain and suffering. Congress could have dictated which types of recovery in Section 1983 actions would attach.
The only indication from Congress as to the proper recovery in
Section 1983 actions is by way of Section 1988. That Section directs
courts to apply the common law analogue which is closest to the
claim at bar. In deprivation of life cases, the analogue undeniably is
wrongful death. Courts then are subject to the state's law on damages
for wrongful death and can contemplate no further remedies than
those provided by the common law. This is true regardless of the
201. Individual Rights, supra note 197, at 184 (this statement only goes so far,
as those value judgments are not violative of the Constitution and laws of the United
States).
202. Williamson, supra note 88, at 149.
203. Id.
204. Individual Rights, supra note 197, at 192.
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tragedy of the case before the judge. Personal emotion should not be
given the weight of law. Deference to the sensibilities and wisdom of
the state is what was contemplated by Congress in enacting Section
1988.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Hedonic damages are best left as factors to be considered in the
jury's pain and suffering award. To remove hedonic damages and set
them up as a separate element in the damage calculus violates the
compensatory purpose of Section 1983. Such damages are not compensatory when they attempt to deter future unconstitutional activity.
Punishment should only be accomplished through punitive damages,
which are awarded in cases manifesting particular circumstances.
Hedonic damages run the risk of being duplicative. They are also
excessive because they are properly a factor of permanence in the
pain and suffering formula. Additionally, if awarded separately, they
replicate those damages available to the heirs of the deceased in other
civil actions. Finally, courts awarding these damages violate the
principles of federalism embodied in the appropriate deference to
legislative intent, judicial restraint, and accommodation of local sensibilities.

